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Michael Burawoy offers three thought-provoking criticisms of our book:
(1) that we abandon class analysis, (2) that we do not suggest an alternative
to the present capitalist order, and, therefore, (3) that our “neoclassical
sociology” abandons the critical vision of classical sociology.
At this abstract level, we plead not guilty to all three charges. First,
instead of abandoning class analysis, our book offers a comprehensive
theory of class structure in state socialism and postcommunism. True, we
pay far less attention to the working class than Burawoy finds acceptable,
but this is because we analyze a situation in which the working class is
far from fully formed: we do not assume that classes, like Pallas Athena,
issue forth fully armed from Zeus’s head. Second, rather than joining the
chorus heralding the end of the history, we think our book injects historical
openness into the analysis of postcommunism. We do not assume one
single capitalism as the last station of history. Instead, we argue for a
research agenda framed in terms of “comparative capitalisms.” Such an
agenda addresses the diversity of market economies without ordering
these forms into a single hierarchy from “advanced” to “backward” or
from “central” to “peripheral.” Finally, we do not contrast different cap-
italisms with a utopia, “concrete” or otherwise, but we do approach them
“critically,” with a measure of Socratic irony.
Moving beyond these abstractions, we reformulate Burawoy’s criti-
cisms empirically, and ask the following questions:
1 Direct correspondence to Gil Eyal, Department of Sociology, University of California,
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1. Is interclass struggle the central cause of social change in the trans-
formation from communism to capitalism?
2. Using social scientific tools, can we identify a noncapitalist (or to
be less shy about it, a socialist) alternative to the “actually existing”
socioeconomic systems of the postcommunist world?
3. Is it necessary to have a vantage point “outside” a system to crit-
ically analyze its mechanisms and dynamics?
Burawoy answers these questions in the affirmative; our answer to each
is an emphatic no.
CLASS STRUGGLE, SOCIAL CHANGE, AND THE TRANSFORMATION
FROM COMMUNISM TO CAPITALISM
Burawoy faults us for not studying the working class, but he does not
explain why he thinks we should study class at all. The best formulation
we find in his review is “Capitalism may be made without capitalists, but
certainly not without workers.” We interpret this to mean that to study
workers is to identify an internal contradiction of capitalism, at the point
of production, where the disconnected-yet-concerted actions of workers
can shape the dynamic of capital accumulation. We do not wish to dispute
the merits of this approach. Instead, we argue that there is another, no
less significant reason why sociologists study classes, especially the work-
ing class. Sociologists study classes because they are interested in collective
actors with the potential to make social change. And, we contend, in the
present historical moment in postcommunist Eastern Europe, the question
of collective agency is far more significant than the question of the internal
limits of capitalism. Indeed, in his rush to denounce us as apologists who
“forget class,” Burawoy misses the greatest question of the postcommunist
transition: namely, where is the working-class-cum-collective-actor we are
supposed to study? At present, there is nothing but a demobilized, dis-
organized mass of workers! We are not looking for “revolutionary con-
sciousness”—“trade union mentality” would do, but it is nowhere in
evidence.
To analyze this striking feature of postcommunist class structure, we
begin in the communist period, arguing that interclass struggle was not
a major force of historical change. Socialist societies were based on “rank”
rather than “class,” and power and privilege were grounded in the pos-
session of “political capital” rather than economic wealth. As a result,
class formation was not very far advanced and interclass struggle was
relatively insignificant. There were some instances of collective working-
class action—Solidarity in Poland, for example—but these were short-
lived and never produced a fully formed class. By the time socialism
broke down, the socialist working class had already disintegrated and lost
whatever modest capacity it had for collective action. In this, Burawoy
reads our analysis correctly: the workers “became . . . spectators of the
transformation.” At the top of the social hierarchy, however, the picture
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was more complex. Socialism, especially in its later years, was disrupted
by periodic attempts at class formation by the intelligentsia and began to
develop into a “dual stratification order” based on rank and class prin-
ciples. In this context, the central dynamic leading to the fall of socialism
was not interclass struggle, but intraclass struggle over the making of a
new dominant class.
Of course, socialism’s breakdown was a complex process, triggered in
part by global changes such as the technological revolution and a new
wave of military competition. The story of internal crisis, however, is one
in which resistance from below played a relatively small part. Socialism
was not brought down by the “working class.” Rather, the old bureaucracy
was toppled by an alliance of reform-communist technocrats and the
liberal intelligentsia. In making this argument, we disagree strenuously
with Burawoy’s claim that “socialism did not have a chance—for world
historic reasons rather than internal limits—to refashion itself before it
was overrun.” For 70 years socialists experimented with various schemes
from Stalinism and Maoism to reform communism and Yugoslavian self-
management. Socialism was not “overrun”; it disintegrated because of
internal contradictions, loss of legitimacy, and economic inefficiency.
The transition from state socialism to market capitalism was one of the
most traumatic events in recent human history, but despite the suffering
and degradation that attended it, society has remained silent. Workers
and peasants engage in ingenious individual coping strategies, but they
rarely act collectively. There is not a single instance in the decade-long
history of postcommunism when the working class pursued collective
action for a noncapitalist alternative. Burawoy misses this astonishing
historical fact entirely. We think it is the great puzzle of the postcommunist
transformation, and our book attempts to solve it.
Our thesis is that a domestic, propertied bourgeoisie has been slow to
develop in postcommunist Eastern Europe, and in its absence, the intel-
ligentsia has constituted itself as a cultural bourgeoisie and undertaken
the building of market capitalism. Hence our title: Making Capitalism
without Capitalists. The emerging social system is one in which the main
source of power and privilege is neither property nor political capital but
cultural capital. This proposition challenges the received wisdom that
former nomenklatura members converted their privileges into economic
resources and became a new propertied bourgeoisie. In fact, we present
evidence to suggest that a large part of the former nomenklatura has been
downwardly mobile. It is the middle ranks of the former managerial elite
who have adopted the most successful strategy. Instead of stealing debt-
ridden, unprofitable state property, middle-level managers broker deals
to sell this property to foreign investors and are appointed as managers
in multinational firms at the same time; this is the strategy of the “com-
pradore intelligentsia.”
Our thesis also explains how the working class has been demobilized
in postcommunism. In a social order dominated by cultural capital, when
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the intelligentsia undertakes to build capitalism “from above,” working-
class formation is hindered. Where the intelligentsia once provided lead-
ership, it now abandons the workers and elaborates a particularly insid-
ious justification of capitalism. Moreover, because this cultural bourgeoisie
is an “invisible” foe and because there is no clearly visible propertied
bourgeoisie, the workers lack a well-defined enemy—an important spur
to collective action. Finally, we observe that workers in formerly socialist
countries, unlike some Western academics, know from their experience
that socialism offers no livable alternative. Thus, another precondition of
collective action is missing: a compelling vision of an alternative future.
We observe that the case studies Burawoy cites actually contribute to
our argument, since none of them provide evidence of collective action
by the working class. Two studies document peasant resistance to decol-
lectivization, but Burawoy fails to mention that these same peasants re-
sisted collectivization vehemently only a few decades earlier. If there is
collective action here, it is not on behalf of collective farming, but to block
the appropriation of agrarian property by former cooperative management
until it is possible to secure the conditions for family farming. Citing
another work on collective protest against welfare reform, Burawoy fails
to observe that the majority of protesters were women acting as mothers,
not as workers. While we agree that neoliberal welfare reform was mis-
conceived, we argue that its socialist alternative was, if possible, even
worse. The decade before the fall of communism witnessed one of the
sharpest declines in life expectancy in demographic history, so it is not
surprising that there was no concerted working-class reaction to welfare
reform. Similarly, the study of Hungarian workers teaming with the
Greens to fight the dumping of Western waste certainly documents mes-
merizing local action. Nationally, however, the Greens failed to get enough
votes to secure even one parliamentary seat. This is amazing when one
recalls that the Greens are heirs to the mass-based environmental move-
ment of the 1980s. Finally, we observe that even Burawoy’s own stories
provide evidence that, despite grim macroeconomic conditions, ordinary
Hungarian workers pursue individual survival strategies rather than col-
lective ones. Taken together, these ethnographic accounts document the
demobilization of the working class: the loss of solidarity, the failure of
collective organization, and the absence of an attractive alternative.
Burawoy has some nice things to say about the earlier work of one of
our number, and his generosity is appreciated. However, he grossly ex-
aggerates the “epistemological break” between The Intellectuals on the
Road to Class Power (1979), Socialist Entrepreneurs (1988), and this latest
book. Making Capitalism without Capitalists is the conclusion of a trilogy
and constitutes, in essence, the third installment in a line of thought and
research that has unfolded over two decades. In the first volume, at the
height of reform communism, Konrád and Szelényi considered whether
the intelligentsia would make a historic compromise with the bureaucracy,
to “rationalize” state socialism and to constitute itself as a new dominant
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class. In Socialist Entrepreneurs, however, Szelényi offered an autocritical
acknowledgement that by the late 1970s this “class project” had failed.
Rather than making concessions to the intellectuals, the bureaucracy per-
mitted the emergence of socialist entrepreneurs, and in this way, demo-
bilized the working class and kept the intellectuals out of power. In Mak-
ing Capitalism without Capitalists, we revise this autocritique and close
the circle. We now understand that the intelligentsia was victorious in its
struggle against the old-line bureaucrats, but not in the way anticipated
by Konrád and Szelényi. Instead of pursuing the project of a rationalized,
humanized socialism, intellectuals now act as a “cultural bourgeoisie.”
Their new project is building “civil society,” liberal democracy, and market
capitalism. There are other continuities among the three books. Socialism
was always depicted as a dual stratification system in which the logic of
class never overruled the logic of rank. Thus, the terminology of “elites”
and “intraclass struggle” is not new: the early work used the term “ruling
elite” (or “ruling estate” in the German and Hungarian editions) to identify
the main enemy of the intelligentsia’s “new class” project. The earlier
work also contained an embryonic theory of social structure, now pre-
sented fully in Making Capitalism without Capitalists.
So, have we “abandoned class” as Burawoy contends? No. First, we
never argued that socialist society was class stratified. Classes were an-
alyzed in statu nascendi, that is, in the making. Second, this latest book
continues the same mode of analysis because we diagnose postcommunism
as a transitional form, on its way to becoming a class society. There is
very little to indicate that interclass struggles played a major role in the
transition, but there is a great deal of evidence that intraclass struggles
over the making of the new dominant class have been central to the
transformation. In short, it is struggles to make classes that are the decisive
battles in postcommunist Eastern Europe.
CAN WE IDENTIFY AN ALTERNATIVE TO CAPITALISM IN THE
POSTCOMMUNIST WORLD?
The central assumption in our book is that it is not useful for social
research to posit “capitalism” as a unitary system or the final destination
of history. It may once have been fruitful to compare the “logics” of state
socialism and capitalism, but since 1989 it seems uninteresting to preserve
the dichotomy simply for its own sake. With the collapse of Cold War
binaries, it becomes possible to see how diverse this putative “unitary
system” really is, indeed, how diverse it always has been. Although market
economies are everywhere defined by private property and integrated by
price-regulated markets, it is increasingly obvious that there are differ-
ences in institutional arrangements and class relations across capitalist
societies that are deeply consequential for those who inhabit them.
It is for this reason, and with some degree of immodesty, that we suggest
the term “neoclassical sociology.” In this, we hark back to Marx, Weber,
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and Durkheim and classical sociology’s central concern with the historical
process of transition to capitalism. Why does capitalism emerge? What
forces propel or obstruct the transition to capitalism? What kind of a
society is created by the transition? These were the big questions of clas-
sical sociology, and we think we should return to them. The difference
between our agenda and that of the classical sociologists, however, is that
they tended to see capitalism as a unitary system—as a single (and for
some, final) destination toward which all societies were converging. This
cannot be true for neoclassical sociologists at the dawn of the 21st century.
The idea of a single capitalist logic does not provide any leverage to
analyze the diverse world we now confront. Except for Cuba and North
Korea, the world is capitalist, and therefore, we argue, neoclassical so-
ciology must engage an agenda of “comparative capitalisms.”
Precisely for this reason (and despite what Burawoy says) neoclassical
sociology is not akin to neoclassical economics. Neoclassical economics
(like Burawoy himself) does operate with the notion of a single capitalist
logic, while neoclassical sociology formulates a wide-ranging comparative
empirical agenda. In this, we admit, our proposal for neoclassical sociology
is not radically original. Institutionalist economic sociology has explored
a similar research program for some time. The term “comparative capi-
talisms” comes from Neil Fligstein, and Bruszt and Stark’s book derives
from this tradition of economic sociology, as do the works of Andrew
Walder and Victor Nee, who analyze the unique capitalist forms emerging
in China. “Comparative capitalisms” also encompasses research on welfare
state regimes by scholars like Gösta Esping-Anderson and Bruce Western,
the story of Japan’s particular capitalist development in research by Chal-
mers Johnson and Ronald Dore, work on Latin America by Peter Evans,
Juan Linz, and Phillippe Schmitter, the burgeoning empirical literature
on globalization by analysts such as Arjun Appadurai and Neil Fligstein,
and many more examples that we have no space to mention. Of course,
Max Weber was the first to research capitalism comparatively, even
though he concluded (classically) that ancient capitalism and Prussian
capitalism were nonviable dead ends. In light of this collective work, then,
we should curb our immodesty and claim only that our contribution to
the idea of neoclassical sociology is to recommend a broader research
program, which considers not only economic organization but culture,
ideology, and, in particular, class structure.
Burawoy offers two criticisms of this program. First, he suggests that
a single iron logic of capitalism rules across the globe. “Russia and Hun-
gary may diverge in remarkable ways but that divergence is . . . a product
. . . of their insertion into what is a singular world capitalist system.” In
other words, Burawoy contends, the diversity of destinations we purport
to study are only the difference between core and periphery. We disagree
profoundly. Ours is a globalizing world, but not a single global capitalist
system. How homogenizing globalization is—how diverse national, re-
gional, and organizational responses to its challenges are—is an empirical
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question. We pursue this question in our book, analyzing the importance
of foreign capital to explain the delayed development of a domestic prop-
ertied bourgeoisie. We find that former communist cadres did not steal
state property, but preferred to be managers in the multinational firms
that invested in East European economies. Indeed, the best indicator of
a successful transition, so far, has been a degree of openness to interna-
tional capital markets. Countries with more foreign investment are also
the countries where the “cultural bourgeoisie” is the strongest—Hungary,
Poland, and to a lesser extent the Czech Republic—and they are now
undergoing rapid economic expansion. In contrast, countries that engage
in autarkic policies and do not attract foreign investors—which are also
the countries where the old nomenklatura is thriving (Russia, Ukraine,
Bulgaria)—are still in the grip of a postcommunist transitional depression.
These outcomes, which are predicted in our book, are precisely the op-
posite of those invoked by Burawoy’s world-system theory, with its em-
phasis on the benefits of autarky and buffers from world markets.
Burawoy’s second point is that we do not consider socialist alternatives
to the hegemonic capitalist order, and he offers his own version of “post-
socialist theory”: “How long will it be before postcommunist intellectuals
reject those Western prescriptions . . . liberal democracy and free markets.
. . . Disillusion[ment] could lead postsocialist intellectuals to contemplate
alternatives to the imported Western models. . . . It is probably too soon
to revisit state socialism and the possibilities that were never allowed to
mature. . . . In time there will be a revisionist history, that . . . will recognize
socialism’s potentialities.” For failing to present a socialist alternative, we
admit we are guilty as charged. Of course Burawoy does not provide any
clear alternative either, nor does he suggest how a social scientist might
study such an alternative. We do not know when or if postcommunist
intellectuals will reject liberal democracy and free markets, and we suspect
Burawoy does not either. We do not even know whether they should
reject liberal democracy. We are certain though, that even if a few intel-
lectuals reread Marx and Trotsky, rethink the lessons of state socialism,
and devise a new socialist “real utopia,” not much will change about
postcommunist societies. Should the efforts of such intellectuals be taken
as evidence that there is such a utopia, such an alternative? We think
not. Alternatives exist not in theorists’ minds but, as Karl Marx taught
us, in the actions of classes, collective actors. Neither we, nor Burawoy,
can point to any such noncapitalist alternative materializing in collective
action in contemporary Eastern Europe.
IS IT NECESSARY TO HAVE A VANTAGE POINT “OUTSIDE” A
SYSTEM TO CRITICALLY ANALYZE IT?
We were taken off guard by the accusation that our analysis was uncritical
and that we have joined the triumphalists celebrating “capitalism as the
end of history.” We thought we wrote a vitriolic critique of the practices
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and ideologies of the postcommunist power elite. Thinking further, we
realized that we simply disagree with Burawoy about what constitutes
critique. Burawoy insists that “comparing capitalism with capitalism” is
merely apologetics. He equates critical analysis with positing a “real uto-
pia” outside capitalism. He also accuses us of abandoning our earlier
critical approach. He is wrong on both counts.
Our practice has always been “immanent critique,” and we are suspi-
cious of critique that is “teleological.” Thus, in Konrád and Szelényi’s
earlier analysis of state socialism, the critique was not formulated from
the “external” perspective of market capitalism but explored the field of
possibilities inside “actually existing” reform communism. Similarly, in
this book, we offer an immanent critique of capitalism without opposing
it to a more desirable form of “actually existing socialism” or some “real
utopia.” It is sufficient to demonstrate, as Foucault does, that the phe-
nomena under investigation are arbitrary, without proving they must be
replaced by a more rational form. In this way, by analyzing capitalism
as a diverse set of alternative destinations, each pregnant with its own
conflicts, each originating in contingent circumstances, we supply the ac-
tors with a broader and more open sketch of the field where they can act
upon their interests. After all, solutions to the social problems of postcom-
munism can only come from the critical imaginations of those who live
under the social conditions analyzed, not from the analyst measuring
reality against an imagined alternative. In this, we think the kind of
teleological critique Burawoy advocates fails to submit the role of the
theorist to critical scrutiny; it falls short of a critical sociology of intel-
lectuals. When Burawoy calls for a “revisionist historiography”—when
he recommends revisiting the history of state socialism to uncover its
potentialities and to imagine an alternative to liberal democracy and free
markets—what is this if not an apologetics for state socialism?
Immanent critique sketches a whole range of alternatives but does not
recommend or celebrate any particular one. Instead, it offers an ironic
view of history to provoke doubt in the minds of those who believe they
know the truth, who think they know what is desirable or inevitable.
True, irony and doubt do not offer quick fixes for the problems of the
world, but they are likely to make us more reflexive about who we are
and what we do. Can social science achieve much more?
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